A collection of one or more df;llices, caell described by irs Digital Device Manual and reachable over a nChllork, is a COllncctedSpace. A set of safety policies may be enforced 011 a ConllectedSpace to ensure ti,e safety ofllle environment in which ti,e ConnecredSpace is deployed. The enforcement of these safery policies by one or more safety cOl/trollers govems the behavior of ti,e devices witllin the ConnectedSpace. We propose a policy-based partitioning schemefor synthesizing k distributed safety controllers such that (a) each device ;s guaranteed to be controlled by no more thall twO colltrollers. and (b) each policy is guarallteed to be enforced by exactly one controller. We present all experimentaL evaLuatiOIl ofollr scheme. Ti,e experimental reslllts show thut the sc/leme is scalable with respect to ti,e nllmber ofdevices and ti,e 1I/lmber ofpolicies. We afso sllow how safety controLLers. lhat are correct witll respect to tlle policies. are synthesized /Ising the tlleory ofsupervisory comroI.
Introduction
Devices controlled via embedded software are becoming widespread. Many such devices are capable of connecting to a local network or the Internet. It may also be possible to monitor and conlrol such devices from a remote location. Such devices are sometimes referred to as "smart" devices. A ConnectedSpace is a collection of one or more such devices. ConnectedSpaces are often deployed in environments such as aircraft, hospitals and health care units. automobiles. and homes. In such environmenls. interactions of two -Bnskar Sridhamn's work was supported in pm by SERe. t Adilya Mathur'S work wn.s supported in part by SERe ned NSF. tKaj·Yuan Cni's work wn.s supp0ned by Ihe National Natural Science Foundation orCh,na and Ihe "863" progr.unmc ofChiua. or more devices may lead to an unsafe situation. For example, consider the cabin of a passenger aircraft. NASA's Air Safety Reporting System lists 52 incidents where a ponable electronic device was suspected to interfere with the air· craft navigation and control syslems [2, 3] . For example, the headphones used by a passenger on a Boeing 757 was suspected to have caused all three autopilot systems on the aircraft (0 SlOp functioning. The use of a cellular phone inside a Cessna 340/A was reported as the likely cause for erroneous readings of the cockpit melers. Similar examples may be found in hospital and health care environments. For example, the interference of an Magnetic Resonance Imaging device with a cardiac Pacemaker is well known [IB}. Such interference may even be fatal [1] .
In each of the above examples. the unsafe situation might arise due to the interaction amongst two or more devices that are individually safe. Such unsafe situations may be prevented by enforcing safety policies on the Connect-edSpace to which the devices belong. Several analysis tools such as fault-trees and Petri nets may be used to obtain the safety policies [6, 7] . Though safety policies exist for many environments [5] . to our knowledge there do not seem 10 exist any safety slandard for the automatic enforcement of such policies on an arbitrary collection of devices. The ability to remotely monitor and control the devices provides opponunities for the automatic enforcement of the policies. Also. the environments in which these devices exist may be modeled as a ConnectedSpace. For instance, an imaging room in a health care unit. or an aircraft. may be modeled as a ConnectedSpace. The safety policies for such environments may then be enforced on the ConnectedSpace by one or more safety controllers.
The theory of supervisory control of Discrete Event Systems (DES), based on a framework of automata and formal languages, was proposed by Ramadge and Wonham [12, 13] . This theory (RW theory) can be used to synthesize a controller when the DES and the control specifications (policies) are both modeled as generators of formal languages. The conlroller is guaranteed to be correct with respect to the specificalion. Ostroff [9, 10] proposed a framework based 00 Timed Transition Model (TIM) and Real-Time Temporal Logic (RITL) for synthesizing conlrollers for Real-time DES (RDES). Given an ROES modeled using TIM, and the control specifications expressed using RTTL, the conlroller may be synthesized using the Controller Design Procedure (COP) described in [9] . Braodin and Wonham [4J show how the RW theory may be used for RDES. Sridharan et aJ. [15] describe CS-CDP, a modified COP, for synthesizing a monolithic safety conlroller for ConnectedSpaces. It is important to emphasize that these techniques employ a cOllstructive approach in comrast to a verifica/ioll-based approach for synthesizing conlrollets. A constructive approach aims at the synthesis of a controller that is correct with respect (0 a given specification. In a verification-based approach, the controller is synthesized and then verified for its correctness. The automated synthesis of correcl safety conlrollers is crilical in ConnectedSpaces. A constructive approach is useful in such situations.
A. Ollr Colltriblftiolls l. A policy-based partitioning scheme (PPS) is proposed for suitably partitioning a given set of safety policies into disjoint sets.
2. PPS is evaluated experimentally and the results are presemed.
3. The procedure for synthesizing the safety controllers, using the partitions generated by the PPS, is described.
B. Organization ofthis Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Con· nectedSpaces are described in Section 2. Safety policies are defined in Section 3. The criteria for the synthesis of the controllers are enumerated in Section 4. Section 5 presents the policy-based partitioning scheme. The results of an experimental evaluation ofPPS is presented in Section 6. Section 7 describes the procedure for synthesizing the safety controllers using CS-CDP. Possible extensions of the work are discussed in Section 8.
ConnectedSpaces
A collection of one or more devices, each described by its Digital Device Manual and reachable over a network, is a ConnectedSpace. The behavior, services, and attributes of each device is specified in the form of a Digital Device Manual (DDM) [IS, 16, 17}. A device may carry either its DDM or a pointer to the location of its DDM. The DDM for a cardiac Pacemaker is shown in Figure l .
Formally, a ConnectedSpace is defined as CS =
• CSM is an augmented finite state automaton for the device. CSM is given by a 6-tuple (Q,L,o,n,qo,SD) where Q = Qu U Qs is a finite set of states, E is a possibly empty set of events, o:Q x E ----> Q is the transition function, n : E ----> N gives the cost associated with a lransition, qo is the ini-Lial state of the device, and S D : Q ----> string is the semalltic descriptioll function. Qs and Qu are nonempty sets of slales such that "Is E Qu, there is a 7 E E such that 0(5,7) E Qs' In practice, Qu may consist of states that may potentially lead to an unsafe situation, and Qs consists of states that arc guaranteed not to cause aoy unsafe situation. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that n gives the maximum time duration required to complete a transition.
• F = {fo, ft, 12,·· ., fb} is a set of mapping functions.
fo : 0 ----> E must be defined by all devices. fo maps the functionality of the device to an event in the finite state machine.
• LS = {1 o •1 1 , ... ,1,.} is a set of labels where each li, i = 1 ... r identifies a particular geographic location.
• 0 = {Ot, 02, ... , Oil} is the set of services provided by the device. Invocation of 0i, i = 1 ... u generates an event (J E E.
• A = {al' a2,' .. ,a,.,cllrSrare, cllrLoc} is the set of attributes exported by the device. CllrState E Q and cllr-Loc E LS specify the current slate and location of the device, respectively, and are exported by all devices.
The initial values of cllrS/ate and cllrLoc are set to qo and 1 o , respectively.
The safe behavior of a ConnectedSpace is governed by the correct enforcement of the associated safety policies. The policies are assumed to reside in a Policy Server (PS). The policies may be added, deleted, or modified at any time during the operation of the ConnectedSpace. In addition, the number and type of the constituent devices may also change. Such a change may be detected by a Device Discovery Service (DDS). DDS may utilize an appropriate discovery protocol. Each device must adhere to the discovery protocol. The policies in PS may be enforced by a Safery Collfroller (SC). An architecture for enforcing a set of safety policies would consist of the ConnectedSpace, the policy server, the device discovery service, and one or more safety controllers. Figure 2 shows an enforcement architecture with distributed safety conlrollers. The PPS approach proposed in this work addresses the issue of synthesizing safety conlrollers for such an architecture. that differ in their safely criticality requirements. For example, it is possible for a laboratory to require a low safety criticality for certain policies, i.e. it may tolerate violations of these policies for a brief period, whereas a health care unit may not tolerate any safety violation. The notion of policy relaxation duration helps specify and enforce such a requirement. It is possible that the devices constituting lhe ConnectedSpace may have varying safety criticality. Also, the same type of device may have differing safety criticality depending on lhe environment and the safety policies lhat govern its behavior. The notion of safety criticality rank provides the abililY to specify and enforce such requirements. Consider a ConnectedSpace that consists of a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) device and a cardiac Pacemaker (PM). For such a ConnectedSpace, a safety policy may be specified as PMSAFE = ""(curStatepM ::: PACING A curStateMRt::: IMAGING) <PM,MRI>(25). The policy is interpreted as follows. The policy is violated when PM and MRI are in PACING and IMAGING states, respectively. Also, PM has a higher safety criticality rank than MRI. Hence, when PM is in PACING, MRI must not be allowed to move to IMAGING. IfMRI is already in IMAG-ING, and if lhere is a request to move PM to PACING, then lhe safety controller has the option of moving :MRI to a different state in order to pennit the request. Also, during lhis move, lhe boolean expression must not remain false for more lhan 25 time units. 
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Criteria for safety controller synthesis
In safety-critical systems such as a ConnectedSpace, several criteria constrain the synthesis of lhe controller. The following criteria are addressed in lhis work.
Safety policies A safety policy P is a 3-tuple given by P=(I,O,r)
where I is a boolean expression in the attributes and slates oflhe devices in the ConnectedSpace, 0 is an ordered list of labels that identify a device, and r E N. The list 0 consists of the labels C•• i = 1 .. . p, of those devices whose states or attributes occur in I.
SCR: P x CS -; N defines tlle rank of a device w.e.l a policy P. SeR(p, D i ) is the safery criricaliry rank of D, w.e.t P. The boolean expression I is fonned using lhe attributes and lhe Qu states of one or more devices.
A safety policy P is considered violated when I remains false for a duration greater lhan r. r, specified in appropriate time units, is lhe relaxLltioll dllration for P. It is possible that ConnectedSpaces are deployed in environments RI. The tennination ofa controller must only affect the behavior of a subset of devices in the ConnectedSpace. R2. Across ConnectedSpaces, each device must be controlled by a fixed number of controllers. R3. The controller must be correct wilh respecl to the safety policies.
RI is important for ensuring that lhe safe behavior of the ConnectedSpace is enforced in a fault-tolerant manner. R2 is important in the design of devices that have a limited memory. Such devices may enter and leave multiple ConnectedSpaces. When such a device exists in a Con-nectedSpace, and is controlled by one or more safety controllers, all requests aniving at the device may be sent to a controller for authorization. The addresses of these controllers may be stored in the device's memory. Typically, the amount of memory for storing lhese addresses is fixed.
If the maximum number of controllers for each device is not fixed, then it is possible for the device to cause an unsafe situation. The inability of the device 10 contact all its controllers. due to the insufficient memory to store all the addresses. may cause such a situation. R3 is vital in safetycritical systems such as ConnectedSpaces. To enforce a safe behavior on such systems, the safety policies must correctly model the safe behavior. Also, the comroller must be correct with respect to the policies. An incorrect controller may lead to unsafe situations Ihat are difficult to detect and diagnose.
Policy~based partitioning scheme
Rl may be satisfied using dislribuled safety controllers. and by assigning only a subset of policies and devices to each controller. The assignment of policies and devices to controllers must also salisfy R2. The proposed policy-based partitioning scheme (PPS) produces partitions, consisting of policies and devices, that satisfy RI and R2. PPS produces non-empty partitions such that each device is present in no more Ihan 2 partitions, and where each policy is assigned to a unique partition.
Given 
PPS constructs a matrix. called apo/icy partition matrix (pPM) using CS and SP. PPM is similar to an adjacency matrix for an undirected graph. An edge-weighted, undirected graph G is then constructed from PPM. A heuristic. that exploits the presence of bridges in G, is used to assign weights to the edges of G. PPM uses the heuristic to maximize k. A minimum-weight k-cut of G is then obtained using the SPLIT [l4] algorithm. The cut is used to obtain the corresponding partitions of CS and SP.
PPS is implemented by executing procedures Proel [16] . Proe2, and Proe3 in sequence. Proel constructs the PPM. Proe2 constructs G from PPM. The set of partitions pp is then computed by Proe3. Proe2 is shown in Figure 3 and Figure 5 .
The characteristics of the results produced by SPLIT may be used 10 Figure 4 ) 1,9, D2,1,1O' D2 ,2,IO' D2,3,10' D3,2,3,  D 4,4,11l D 4,1,1l' D 4 ,0,1l> D S,4,7, D O,0,7, D7,12,8,  D S ,3,4, D 9 ,13 ,S}. Figure 6 shows Ihe undirected graph G and the weight function w for CSPACE.
Let the suggested number of partitions be 9 = 5. Proe3 computes kma:r = 6 by executing SPLIT for = {vl,vz, ... ,vn ,dl ,d2, ... ,d (c) The suggested number of partitions 9 '5 n.
OUTPUT: A set ofpartitiolls pp = {GI,G 2 , ... ,Gd, where k '5 g, G; = (\1;,£;) , Vi~SP, andE~as, i = 1. . . k.
I. letE = EI UEz such that'rle E El,w(e) = I,and'rfe E E2, w(e) = 00. 2. let cc = {G~, G;, . .. ,G~mo,,} be the cOlll1ected cOlI/pol/elJls of C' = (V, Ed.
3. if 9 > k",,,,, thcn set k = krrl""" PP = cc and proceed to Slep 6.
setk=g.
5. dctermine the k-cul for G using the SPLIT algoriLhm. let p = {G II G2, ... ,Gk} be the partitions of G, and let S = {el' C2, ... ,e3 } be the edges of the cut, produced by the algorithm. p is obtained by removing the edges in S from E. k=g=5. Proe3 computes p = {Gl,G2.G3,G4,G5} where G1 = ({Vl,Vg}, {D 1 ,1,9, D 2 ,1,1O})' G 2 = ({V2. V3, VIO}. {D2,1,0, D2,2,1O, D2,3,10, D3,2,3, DS,3,4} ). G3 = ({v",VO,V7,Vl1}. {D4 ,4,11> D4,6,1I. D4 ,5,1l, D5,4,7,  DO,0,7, DS ,3,4} Table 3 shows the representative values of n, m, k, IE), and lVI, for d = 0.4, for each of the four classes. Table 3 also shows the average values ofTproc2,Tproc3,andTpps, The effect of density on Tpps is shown in Figure 7 , As may be observed from Table 3 and Figure 7 . Tpps increases wilh increasing size of the ConnecledSpace and the density of SP. As can be observed from Table 3 . the percentage CPU usage of Proe3 increases with increase in the size of the ConnectcdSpace. Also, the running lime of PPS is dominated by Prod. The impacl of d on kma:z: is shown in Figure 8 , As may be observed from the figure. the value of kma:z: is higher for o< d < D,S. For d :::: 0.5. kmo.:z: drops to 2. This effect may be observed for each of the four classes. This is due to the increase in deYavg with increasing d. Figure 9 and Figure   10 show the impacl of d on deg avg and lEI, respectively. As may be observed from the figures, both d avg and lEI increase linearly wilh respect 10 ,2> "" 10 . "
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Synthesizing the safety controllers
A safely controller for a ConnectedSpace may be synthesized using CS·CDP by expressing the ConnectedSpace and lhe safety policies using TIM and RITL. respeclively [15] . CS-CDP produces a safety controller SC and a control table. SC is specified using a finite state nutomaton. The control table defines the action that muSl be taken by the controller on!eceivin~an event. Given the sel of partilions pp = {G I , G 2 , ... ,G k }, a controller is assigned to each partition. The sel of k controllers may then be obtained by executing SynthProc [16] on each partition in pp. By Propl. each policy is enforced by exactly one controller. By Prop2, a device is controlled by no more than two con-.. trollers. Table 4 shows the assignment of devices and policies to safety conlrollers for CSPACE. [16] . IfMRl is currently in state IMAGING. and ASense is requested, se s will enable (allow) ASense and then force the transition Stop on MRI. When PM is in state PACING, and the transition Start is requested, it will be disabled (denied). Hence, all transitions of a higher ranked device. such as PM in the example. will be enabled while adhering to me safety policies. 
Summary and further work
ConnectedSpaces and Digital Device Manuals are described in this paper. A policy-based partitioning scheme is proposed for the synthesis of distributed safety controllers. The results of an experimental evaluation of the scheme is presented. A procedure for synmesizing the safety controllers, using me theory of supervisory control. is described.
Two limitations of PPS need to be addressed. (l) For safety policies with density> 0.5, the bridge-based heuristic may only produce a maximumof2 panitions. To address this limitation, alternate heuristics need to be investigated.
(2) In addition to the boolean expression I of a safety policy, the safety criticality ranks of the devices may also need to be incorporated into the graph model. Addressing this limitation may be useful in environments where a subset of the safety controllers need to be made more fault-tolerant than the others.
The constructive approach for controller synthesis described in this paper is suitable in environments where me controllers are deployed external to the devices. Situations might arise where it may not be possible to deploy external safety controllers. A ConnectedSpace in a battle field or an open soccer field are examples of such situations. These situations may require the use of embedded safety controllers. The possible use ofPPS for me synthesis of embedded con· trollers needs to be investigated. In these situations, it is also possible that the number and types of devices. and the safety policies are modified frequently. A long execution duration of PPS may not be acceptable in such cases. To address ,,' -",--;'-7. 
